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THE UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES: THE RATIONALE OF THE
90-YEAR WAITING PERIOD
Lawrence W. Waggonert
The Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities in 1986.1 The perpetuity-re-
form efforts of the American Law Institute in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) inspired the Uniform Act.2 The Restatement and the Uniform
Act employ the so-called wait-and-see approach to perpetuity re-
form. Wait-and-see is a two-step strategy. Step One preserves the
validating side of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities (the
common-law Rule): By satisfying the common-law Rule, a
nonvested future interest in property is valid at the moment of its
creation.3 Step Two is a salvage strategy for future interests that
would have been invalid at common law: Rather than invalidating
such interests at creation, wait-and-see allows a period of time,
called the waiting period, for the contingencies to work out
harmlessly.4
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t Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The author served as
the Reporter for the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. The author gratefully
acknowledges helpful suggestions on prepublication drafts of this Article from Gregory
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1 UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETurFIES, 8A U.L.A. 103 (Supp. 1988)
[hereinafter UNIF. ACT].
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) §§ 1.1-1.6 (1983)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
3 UNIF. ACT § 1(a)(1); RESTATEMENT § 1.3(1). In estate-planning practice, every
incentive remains to comply with the common-law Rule, through the use of a standard
perpetuity saving clause, see infra note 35, if appropriate, or one tailored to the particular
trust or property arrangement, or otherwise.
4 UNIF. ACT § 1(a)(2); RESTATEMENT § 1.3(2). Nearly all trusts (or other property
arrangements) will have terminated by their own terms long before the waiting period
expires, leaving the waiting period to extend unused (and ignored) into the future long
after the contingencies have been resolved and the property distributed. See Waggoner,
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569, 579-90
(1986) [hereinafter Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule]. In the unlikely event that the con-
tingencies have not been resolved by the expiration of the waiting period, the disposi-
tion is to be reformed by the court so that all contingencies are resolved within the
allowable period. UNIF. ACT § 3; RESTATEMENT § 1.5.
Neither the Restatement nor the Uniform Act authorized judicial reformation at any
time before the expiration of the waiting period (except in certain specified cases). The
Drafting Committee of the Uniform Act and its Advisors discussed at length and specifi-
cally rejected the "immediate cy pres" idea, as it is sometimes called, under which the
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Although the traditional method of measuring the waiting pe-
riod is by reference to the period of lives in being at the creation of
the interest (the measuring lives) plus 21 years, there are various
difficulties and costs associated with identifying and tracing a set of
actual measuring lives to see which one is the survivor and when he
or she dies.5 Consequently, in a step the framers of a Restatement of
the Law of Property could not appropriately have taken in the early
1980s, given the constraint of basing their position on existing law,
the framers of the Uniform Act decided to forgo the use of actual
measuring lives and use instead an allowable waiting period of a flat
90 years. 6 The framers intended the 90 years to represent a reason-
able approximation of the average period of time reached when ac-
tual measuring lives are used.
The Uniform Act has been endorsed by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association (on the recommendation of the
Council of the A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
statute grants a right to reformation at any time, merely on a showing of a violation of
the common-law Rule. A few states have adopted this approach, but the experience
under it has not been satisfactory. Almost all of the cases that have arisen have involved
age contingencies in excess of 21 or a variation thereof. An example of such an age-
contingency case is set forth infra note 26. Although the vesting of the interests in such
cases is almost certain to occur well within the period of a life in being plus 21 years, and
although such interests can easily be validated in their original form by a perpetuity
saving clause (see infra note 35 and accompanying text), the courts have chosen to "re-
form" such dispositions by lowering the age contingencies to 21. E.g., Estate of Ghiglia,
42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974). Such an approach amounts to an un-
warranted distortion of the donor's intention, a distortion that is avoided by the ap-
proach of the Uniform Act and the Restatement under which reformation is delayed
until the contingencies as originally written by the donor have been given a chance to
work out harmlessly. See Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718, 1755-59
(1983); see also UNIF. ACT § 5 comment; Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra, at 596
n.46.
Another possible approach under a general reformation ("immediate cy pres") doc-
trine is for the courts to insert a perpetuity saving clause into dispositions that violate
the common-law Rule. This type of reformation has been advocated by academics, e.g.,
Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1963), but not adopted by any court. This approach, were a court to adopt it, would be
superior to lowering age contingencies to 21. The donor's intention would not be un-
necessarily frustrated. However, even this approach is less efficient than the approach of
the Uniform Act. The period of time produced by a judicially inserted perpetuity saving
clause would be about the same in length as that which is automatically granted by the
Uniform Act without front-end litigation. The more efficient course, opted for by the
Uniform Act (and the Restatement), is to defer the right to reformation until after the
waiting period has run its course. Deferring the right to reformation enormously
reduces the necessity and cost of litigation because the contingencies attached to most
future interests that would otherwise have fallen victim of the common-law Rule will be
resolved well within the allowable waiting period. Litigation to reform an offending dis-
position will seldom become necessary. See UNIF. ACT § 3 comment; Waggoner, Uni-
form Statutory Rule, supra, at 596 & n.46.
5 See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
6 UNIF. ACT § l(a)(2).
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Law), the Board of Regents of the American College of Probate
Counsel, and the Board of Governors of the American College of
Real Estate Lawyers. It has been enacted, so far, in three states7 and
appears to be on its way toward enactment in several others.
I
MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE 90-YEAR PERIOD
My purpose in this short Article is to set the record straight
concerning the rationale for the 90-year waiting period. The ques-
tion arises because, in a pair of recent law review articles,8 Professor
Dukeminier labels the 90-year waiting period a clone9 of the
"twelve-healthy-babies ploy," a device that is unused in actual prac-
tice by estate-planning attorneys and that was denounced by the fa-
ther of wait-and-see reform, Professor W. Barton Leach. The device
is one that allows drafters of trusts and other property arrangements
to tie up property for an abnormally long time; it accomplishes this
purpose by using, as measuring lives, babies from long-lived fami-
lies. As Professor Leach put it, a testator or settlor. could, by using
this ploy,
tie up his property, regardless of lives and deaths in his family, for
an unconscionable period - viz. twenty-one years after the deaths
of a dozen or so healthy babies chosen from families noted for
longevity, a term which, in the ordinary course of events, will add
up to about a century. 10
Professor Leach rejected this ploy as a "capricious exercise of the
power of the dead hand."' 1
Professor Dukeminier charges that the framers of the Uniform
Act intended the 90-year waiting period to institutionalize this ploy.
He writes:
[W]hy did the Uniform Statutory Rule against Perpetuities come
to insert in every trust a 90-year wait-and-see period? It is, in ef-
fect, a proxy for a period measured by the lives of a dozen healthy
7 The states are Minnesota, Nevada, and South Carolina. MINN. STAT.
§§ 501A.01-501A.07 (West Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103-111.1035
(Michie Supp. 1987) (repealing its former wait-and-see statute, which delimited the al-
lowable waiting period by reference to actual measuring lives determined by the causal-
relationship method); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
8 Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo]; Dukeminier,
A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1884-87 (1986) [hereinafter
Dukeminier, Modern Guide].
9 Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra note 8, at 1886 ("The Uniform Statute has
cloned Professor Leach's dozen healthy babies.").
10 VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16, at 52 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
11 J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13 (2d ed. 1962).
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babies plus 21 years. This is implicitly conceded in the Rationale
for the Uniform Statute, set forth in the Prefatory Note....
The Uniform Statute attempts to justify the 90-year period as
a saving clause on the ground that, under existing common law, a
knowledgeable lawyer can, if he wishes, tie up property in trust for
approximately 90 years. But the fundamental fact is: Lawyers do
not use saving clauses that have a dozen healthy babies as measur-
ing lives or that always, or even on average, produce a 90-year
perpetuities period. The Uniform Statute thus provides another
ironic twist of fate: It takes what might happen, what lawyers
might do, and not what actually occurs, as the justification for its
version of an actualities test.12
This account of the rationale for the 90-year period is a misun-
derstanding. As the Reporter for the Uniform Act, I can say with
certainty that the 90-year period was not derived in the fashion Pro-
fessor Dukeminier suggests, that is, by approximating the period of
time that would be reached, on average, by the length of the lifetime
of the survivor of twelve healthy babies from unrelated families
(plus 21 years). To my recollection, such an idea was never seri-
ously discussed in the deliberations of the Drafting Committee or
on the floor of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. Nor is there anything in the Uniform Act, its pref-
atory note and comments, or my writings that implicitly concedes or
even mildly suggests that this ploy was the actual basis for selecting
90 years.' 3 There is, in short, no foundation for the claim that the
Act takes as the justification for its selection of 90 years the twelve-
healthy-babies ploy denounced by Professor Leach.
Actual justification aside, what of the claim that the 90-year pe-
riod is in effect a proxy for the period that would be reached by the
twelve-healthy-babies ploy? The life expectancy of a new-born baby
12 Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 8, at 1031, 1035-36; see also
Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra note 8, at 1885 ("The proponents of the Uniform Stat-
ute believe that a ninety-year perpetuities period is justified by the fact that, under ex-
isting law, a knowledgeable lawyer can tie up property in trust for approximately ninety
years by selecting youthful measuring lives.").
13 The actual basis for selecting 90 years is set forth in the prefatory note to the
Uniform Act. In explaining that the 90-year period is built on the life expectancy (plus
21 years) of the youngest measuring life, the prefatory note cites Waggoner, Perpetuities:
A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 20 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. ch. 7 (1986) [hereinafter Waggoner, Progress Report], which shows in table 1, Id.
703.4, at 7-17, that the reference to the youngest measuring life was to the transferor's
youngest descendant in being when the trust was created; no reference to twelve healthy
babies from unrelated families appears in Progress Report, in the prefatory note to the
Uniform Act, or my other writings about the Uniform Act. See Waggoner, Uniform Statu-
tory Rule, supra note 4; Waggoner, Wait-and-See: The New American Uniform Act on Perpetu-
ities, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234 (1987) [hereinafter Waggoner, Wait-and-See].
For further discussion of the actual basis for selecting 90 years, see Part II of this
Article, infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
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today is 75 years. 14 With the 21-year tack-on period, this method
would, at first impression, appear to produce a total period of 96
years (75 + 21). Ninety-six years is longer than the 90 years actu-
ally adopted in the Uniform Act, but only by about 6.7 percent. If
that were all there were to it, the claim that the 90-year period is in
effect a proxy for the twelve-healthy-babies ploy, while an exaggera-
tion, would not be an exaggeration of such proportion as to be
wholly unfair.
But that is not all there is to it. An actual approximation of the
twelve-healthy-babies ploy would, in fact, produce a much longer
period of time-a period of about 113 years, not 96 years. The rea-
son is as follows. It is true that, as a whole, the average number of
years lived per member of a group of twelve healthy babies, selected
at random (not specially chosen from families noted for longevity),
is 75 years-that is, the average life expectancy of each individual
member of the group is 75 years. An average group of twelve, how-
ever, will include babies who will die prematurely and babies who
will outlive their individual life expectancies. Under the twelve-
healthy-babies ploy, the period would be measured by the lifetime
(plus 21 years) of the longest living member of the group, not by the
average number of years lived per member of the group as a whole.
The life expectancy of the longest living member of a group of
twelve new-born babies is about 92 years, 15 not 75 years; with the
21-year tack-on period, the twelve-healthy-babies ploy would pro-
duce, on average, the period of 113 years (92 + 21) mentioned
above. 16 One hundred thirteen years is 25.6 percent longer than
the 90 years actually adopted in the Uniform Act. The claim that the
90-year period is in effect a proxy for the twelve-healthy-babies ploy
14 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1987, at 71 table 108 (107th ed. 1986).
15 The 92-year life expectancy was computed by applying a complicated actuarial
formula to the data set forth in table LN, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1984). Starting with
an original cohort of 100,000 new-borns, table LN gives the number of people who live
to age one (97,998), age two (97,876), and so on to ages 109 (14) and 110 (0).
I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Cecil Nesbitt, professor emeritus of
mathematics at the University of Michigan, for deriving the actuarial formula used in the
computation; he derived the formula from the principles set forth in N. BOWERS, H.
GERBER, J. HICKMAN, D. JONES & C. NESBITT, ACTUARIAL MATHEMATICS ch. 16 (1986).
16 Recall that Professor Leach judged the twelve-healthy-babies ploy to produce a
period of about 100 years. See supra text accompanying note 10. Professor Leach wrote
this in the early 1950s, when individual life expectancy was about 68 years, not 75 years
as it is today. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (pt. 1), at 55 table B 107-115 (1975). Professor
Leach, in projecting a 100-year period, must, therefore, have attempted to take account
of the phenomenon described in the text, above, that the longest living member of a
group of new-born babies will outlive, by an appreciable margin, his or her individual
life expectancy. Otherwise, Professor Leach would have projected a period of about 89
years (68 + 21), not 100 years, for the twelve-healthy-babies ploy.
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is, therefore, an exaggeration of considerable proportion. The 90-
year period of the Uniform Act falls substantially short of the long-
est time permissible under the current common-law Rule.
II
THE RATIONALE OF THE 90-YEAR PERIOD
In truth, the philosophy behind the 90-year period was to fix a
period of time that approximates the average period of time that
would traditionally be allowed by the wait-and-see doctrine.1 7
There was no intention to use the flat-period-of-years method as a
means of lengthening the waiting period beyond its traditional
boundaries. The fact that the traditional period roughly averages
out to a longish-sounding 90 years is a reflection of a quite different
phenomenon: the dramatic increase in longevity that society as a
whole has experienced in the course of the twentieth century.',
Seen in this light, the 90-year period is an evolutionary step in the
development of the wait-and-see doctrine.
As mentioned earlier, the traditional method of delimiting the
allowable waiting period is to use actual measuring lives plus 21
years. Specifically, under this method, a group of persons-called
the measuring lives-is identified. Once the group is identified, the
lives of all its members are traced to see which one outlives all the
others and when that survivor dies. The allowable waiting period
extends 21 years beyond the death of that last surviving measuring
life.
From its inception, the actual-measuring-lives approach has
been plagued by two problems: identification and tracing. The
identification problem concerns the method by which the measuring
lives are to be chosen. Rival methods have been advanced. Under
one method, long advocated by Professor Dukeminier,19 the mea-
suring lives are identified by testing each disposition to determine
the persons whose lives have a "causal relationship" to the vesting
or failure of the future interest in question. The actual meaning of
causal relationship is in dispute, 20 and the adoption of that method
17 The philosophy appears in the prefatory note to the Uniform Act.
18 The average life expectancy in 1900 was 47 years, as compared to the 75 years
projected today. See Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 4, at 588 n.32 (table).
19 Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 1 (1960);
Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (1985) [hereinafter
Dukeminier, Measuring Lives]; Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra note 8; Dukeminier, Wait-
and-See: The Causal Relationship Principle, 102 L.Q. REV. 250 (1986) [hereinafter
Dukeminier, Causal Relationship].
20 Compare Dukeminier, Measuring Lives, supra note 19, at 1660 ("causal relationship
must include any person who can affect vesting, either in possession or interest") with
Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 1714, 1719
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could require front-end litigation to determine the identity of the
measuring lives in a given case. Neither the Restatement nor the
Uniform Act adopted the causal-relationship method.21 The Re-
statement specifies the measuring lives in a different way. The Re-
statement uses a list composed, generally speaking, of the
transferor, the beneficiaries of the disposition, the parents and
grandparents of the beneficiaries, and, in certain cases, the donee of
a nonfiduciary power of appointment; of the foregoing, those who
are in being at the creation of the interest are the measuring lives. 22
It soon became apparent that the Restatement's list contained ambi-
guities, at least at the fringes, 23 which could also require front-end
litigation to determine the full compliment of measuring lives in a
given case. The framers of the Uniform Act concluded that an am-
biguity-free formulation of the specified-list method would necessi-
tate a complex set of statutory provisions. 24
In sum, both methods of identifying actual measuring lives en-
tail identification problems: If the specified-list method is used, the
measuring lives are difficult to describe in statutory language that is
both uncomplicated and unambiguous; the statutory language nec-
essary to adopt the causal-relationship method is not so difficult to
draft as it is to apply to actual cases.
The second problem plaguing the actual-measuring-lives ap-
proach is that of tracing. No matter how the measuring lives are
identified, the lives of those actual individuals must be traced to de-
termine which one is the longest survivor and when he or she died.
The tracing and identification problems are exacerbated by the
premise, seemingly accepted under both methods, that the measur-
ing lives cannot always remain a static group, assembled once and
for all at the beginning. Instead, individuals who were once measur-
ing lives must be dropped from the group if certain events happen
(such as the individual's divorce, adoption out of the family, or as-
signment of his or her beneficial interest to another); conversely,
(1985) (causal relationship formula, "in certain of its particulars, is arbitrary and
ambiguous").
21 In his most recent article, Professor Dukeminier appears to have largely aban-
doned the wait-and-see cause in favor of the reformation ("immediate cy pres") method
of perpetuity reform. Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 8, at 1079-80. Neither
the Restatement nor the Uniform Act adopted that method, either. The Drafting Com-
mittee of the Uniform Act and its Advisors discussed that method at length and, for the
reasons set forth supra note 4, found it less attractive than wait-and-see coupled with a
deferred right to reformation.
22 RESTATEMENT § 1.3(2).
23 Ambiguities in the Restatement's list are identified in Dukeminier, Measuring
Lives, supra note 19, at 1681-1701.
24 The draft of such a set of statutory provisions prepared for the consideration of,
but not adopted by, the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Act, is set forth in Wag-
goner, Progress Report, supra note 13, 703.1, at 7-26 n.18.
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individuals who were not among the initial group of measuring lives
must be included later if certain events happen (such as marriage,
adoption into the family, or receipt of another's beneficial interest
by assignment or succession) and if they were living when the inter-
est in question was created. 25 This instability within the group of
measuring lives heightens the potential for a further round of litiga-
tion at one point or another during the running of the waiting
period.
By opting for a flat period of years, the framers of the Uniform
Act eliminated the clutter that has heretofore plagued the wait-and-
see strategy-the problems of identifying, tracing, and possibly liti-
gating the make-up of a sometimes-fluctuating group of measuring
lives. The expiration of a waiting period measured by a flat period
of years is litigation free, easy to determine, and unmistakable.
The framers of the Uniform Act considered objections to re-
placing the actual-measuring-lives approach with a flat period of
years, despite the gain in administrative simplicity that would result.
One such objection was the idea that the use of actual measuring
lives-especially if determined by the causal-relationship method-
generates a waiting period that self-adjusts to each situation, some-
how extending the dead hand no further than necessary in each
case.2 6 A flat period of years obviously cannot replicate a self-
25 Dukeminier, Measuring Lives, supra note 19, at 1672-73 (causal-relationship
method); id. at 1697-99 (Restatement's specified-list method).
26 Perpetuity specialists may wish to notice that Professor Dukeminier has made
such a claim: He has stated that the causal-relationship method for determining the
measuring lives produces a waiting period that "extends the dead hand no further than
necessary" in each case. Dukeminier, Causal Relationship, supra note 19, at 250, 265; see
also Dukeminier, Measuring Lives, supra note 19, at 1710-11 ("The causal relationship
principle provides appropriate measuring lives-persons who can affect vesting-and it
automatically adjusts the lives to fit the facts of each particular case. Because it self-
adjusts to each limitation, the causal relationship principle, following the principle of
parsimony, effects what scientists would call an elegant solution. It provides no more
measuring lives than are necessary to deal with the scrivener's particular mistake....
[T]he causal relationship principle ... fit[s] the shoe to the foot .... ").
To test Professor Dukeminier's claim, consider the following example, which is Ex-
ample 1 from Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 4, at 577, 581:
G died, bequeathing property in trust, income in equal shares to G's chil-
dren for the life of the survivor, then in equal shares to G's grandchil-
dren, remainder in corpus to G's grandchildren who reach age 30; if none
reaches 30, to a specified charity.
The youngest causal-relationship measuring life in this example is G's youngest
grandchild living at G's death. Taking G's death to occur at age 75 (G's life expectancy),
and placing G's disposition in each of four hypothetical families (deemed to be repre-
sentative of actual families) developed in that article, see id. at 582-85, the projected time
of actual vesting (when G's youngest grandchild will reach age 30) is 5 years after G's
death in Family I, 15 years after G's death in Family II, 25 years after G's death in Family
III, and 35 years after G's death in Family IV. The projected allowable waiting period
under a causal-relationship regime is much longer: 72 years in Family 1, 82 years in
Family II, 92 years in Family III, and 96 years in Family IV. See id. at 590-91 n.39. Thus,
[Vol. 73:157164
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adjusting function. This objection proved unfounded, however, for
the actual-measuring-lives approach also fails to perform a self-ad-
justing function. Although that approach produces waiting periods
of different lengths from one case to another, it does not generate a
waiting period that expires at a natural or logical stopping point
along the continuum of each disposition, thereby pinpointing the
time before which actual vesting ought to be allowed and beyond
which it ought not to be permitted. Instead, the actual-measuring-
lives approach-under either the specified-list or causal-relationship
method-generates a waiting period whose length almost always ex-
ceeds by some arbitrary period of time the point of actual vesting in
cases that are traditionally validated by the wait-and-see strategy. 27
The actual-measuring-lives approach, therefore, performs a margin-
of-safety function, 28 a function that can be replicated by the use of a
the projected waiting period produced by the causal-relationship method exceeds the time
of projected actual vesting by periods ranging from 61 years (Family IV) to 67 years
(Families I, II, and III).
In fact, if I had fashioned the above example more realistically, see infra note 30, I
would have made the gift-over (in case none of the grandchildren reaches age 30) in
favor of G's descendants rather than a specified charity. This simple modification of the
example does not alter the projected time of actual vesting. But it does shift the identity
of the youngest causal-relationship measuring life from G's youngest grandchild to G's
youngest descendant in each family; this, in turn, makes the length of the projected
causal-relationship waiting period be 92 years in one of the families (Family III) and 96
years in the other families (Families I, II, and IV). As modified, the projected causal-
relationship waiting period exceeds the projected time of actual vesting by as much as 91
years. The idea that the causal-relationship formula "extends the dead hand no further
than necessary" in each case by "fit[ting] the shoe to the foot" appears to be a question-
able proposition. See also infra note 28.
The above example, in either its originally published form or as modified above,
illustrates the fact that the waiting period for wait-and-see (no matter by what method it
is delimited) performs a margin-of-safety function, not a self-adjusting function. The
example also illustrates the idea that the margin of safety can be quite extensive in given
cases. See supra note 4. The contingencies in the vast majority of perpetuity-violation
cases will be resolved long before the waiting period expires. In challenging the 90-year
period allowed by the Uniform Act, Professor Dukeminier has noted this point and
asked: Why, then, "have a 90-year period?" Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra
note 8, at 1047. The answer is that this is how the waiting period works-even under the
causal-relationship formula. Having an unused end-portion of the waiting period does no
harm and its length has nothing at all to do with dead-hand control. Vesting will occur
when it does in trusts such as the one illustrated in the above example, whether the
unused end-portion of the waiting period is 5 years, 50 years, or 500 years.
27 See supra note 26. For further demonstration of this point, see Waggoner, Uni-
form Statutory Rule, supra note 4, at 577-79, 581-90; Waggoner, Wait-and-See, supra note
13, at 236-38.
28 In point of fact, the margin of safety produced by the actual-measuring-lives ap-
proach (even under a causal-relationship regime) can be quite erratic from one case to
another: The waiting period produced by the causal-relationship method can be longer
in cases in which actual vesting is projected to take place sooner, and shorter (though
still ample) in cases in which actual vesting is projected to take place later. For demon-
stration of this phenomenon, see Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note 13, 703.4, at 7-
18 to 7-19.
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proxy such as the flat 90-year period under the Uniform Act.
In standard cases, the rivalry between the causal-relationship
and the specified-list methods of identifying actual measuring lives
is very little concerned with the length of the waiting period. Often,
the specified-list method will produce a greater number of measur-
ing lives than the causal-relationship method. In the normal course
of events, however, the waiting period is not governed by the
number of measuring lives, but by the lifetime of the youngest. Un-
less the additional measuring lives are younger than the others or
are clustered in very young age groups, such as under the twelve-
healthy-babies ploy, a greater number of measuring lives seldom
adds to the length of the waiting period.29 In the normal course of
events, the youngest measuring life is the key to the length of the
allowable waiting period, and no matter which method is used for
determining the identity of the measuring lives, the youngest mea-
suring life, in standard trusts, is likely to be the transferor's young-
est descendant living when the trust was created. 30 The 90-year
period of the Uniform Act is premised on this proposition. Using
29 Professor Dukeminier has attacked the Restatement by observing that it specifies
a greater number of measuring lives than the causal-relationship formula and stating
that the greater the number of measuring lives, the longer the waiting period.
Dukeminier, Measuring Lives, supra note 19, at 1710-11; Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo,
supra note 8, at 1032 n.22, 1075. Usually, however, the measuring lives added by the
Restatement are older (the transferor; the parents and grandparents of the beneficiaries)
and their addition to the group would seldom end up adding to the length of the waiting
period. A greater number of measuring lives does, however, add to the administrative
burden of tracing their lives out; tracing out the lives of the older measuring lives cannot
be dispensed with, because of the remote possibility, in every case, that one of them will
beat the odds and outlive all the others, either because the younger ones die prema-
turely or one of the older ones sufficiently outlives his or her life expectancy.
30 All beneficiaries of a trust who are living when the trust was created are on the
Restatement's list of measuring lives. RESTATEMENT § 1.3(2). Though the point is dis-
puted, Professor Dukeminier maintains that all beneficiaries of an otherwise invalid in-
terest are automatically to be counted as causal-relationship measuring lives.
Dukeminier, Measuring Lives, supra note 19, at 1661; Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra note
8, at 1881; Dukeminier, Causal Relationship, supra note 19, at 257. It should also be noted
that the transferor's descendants are typically measuring lives under standard perpetuity
saving clauses, either by direct designation or by virtue of a designation of the benefi-
ciaries of the trust as the measuring lives. See infra note 35.
In the judgment of the Drafting Committee and its Advisors (a group that included
experienced estate-planning attorneys), almost all family-oriented trusts, at some point,
create a beneficial interest in favor of a multiple-generation class such as the transferor's
descendants or issue. Usually, that beneficial interest is a nonvested future interest in
the corpus of the trust; and, that beneficial interest is one that is otherwise invalid in the
fraction of trusts that violate the common-law Rule and to which wait-and-see applies.
In the judgment of the Drafting Committee and its Advisors, this is true even in fertile-
octogenarian and unborn-widow cases. In such cases (contrary to the suggestion in
Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 8, at 1033), the youngest measuring life
ordinarily is not the youngest child of the "fertile octogenarian" (who likely is an adult)
or the life tenant whose income interest precedes that of the "unborn widow" (who also
likely is an adult), but the beneficiaries of the remainder interest in the trust's corpus
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four hypothetical families deemed to be representative of actual
families, the framers determined that, on average, the transferor's
youngest descendant in being at the transferor's death-assuming
the transferor's death to occur between ages 60 and 90, which is
when 73 percent of the population die-is about 6 years old.3 1 The
remaining life expectancy of a 6-year-old is about 69 years.3 2 The
69 years, plus the 21-year tack-on period, gives an allowable waiting
period of 90 years. Although this method may not be scientifically
accurate to the nth degree,3 3 the Drafting Committee considered it
that takes effect on the death of the "fertile octogenarian's" last living child or on the
death of the "unborn widow."
In actual trusts, the typical set of beneficiaries of that remainder interest are the
transferor's "issue" or "descendants," although law professors (myself included, see
supra note 26) are not always careful to fashion their hypothetical cases so. For hypo-
thetical cases that are realistic on this point, however, seeJ. DUKEMINIER & S.JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 794 (3d ed. 1984) (Case 7, an unborn-widow case in which
the remainder interest is in favor of T's "son's issue."); Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra
note 8, at 1876-77 (Illustration 8, a fertile-octogenarian case in which the remainder
interest is in favor of A's "grandchildren," who presumably are T's great-grandchildren;
it would be unlikely for T to have a descendant in being at his or her death younger than
a great-grandchild); id. at 1878 (Illustration 9, an unborn-widow case in which the re-
mainder interest is in favor of A's "issue," who presumably are also T's issue).
If the transferor has no descendants or issue, a family-oriented trust will likely be
for the benefit of a collateral line of descent (such as descendants of the transferor's
parents). (This is not only true today-e.g., Estate of Pearson, 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336
(1971)-but also true in even so ancient a case asJee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch.
1787). In that case, the beneficiaries of Edward Audley's testamentary trust included
"my niece Mary Hall and the issue of her body lawfully begotten and to be begotten"; as
it turned out in the actual case, Mary Hall had no issue living at Edward's death, and,
had that case arisen today, only this fortuitous turn of events would prevent the young-
est measuring life under the Restatement's list or the causal-relationship formula from
being a very young child.) In most such cases, the youngest measuring life would be the
youngest descendant in that collateral line of descent. See Pearson, 442 Pa. at 172, 275
A.2d at 336. There is no reason to think that the age of that youngest descendant, on
average, would be appreciably different from the age of the 6-year-old descendant of the
transferor upon whose remaining life expectancy the 90-year waiting period of the Uni-
form Act is built.
31 Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note 13, 703.4, at 7-17.
32 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1986, at 69 table 108 (106th ed. 1985).
33 Professor Dukeminier has suggested that a more accurate method of determin-
ing the average length of the waiting period under an actual-measuring-lives approach
would be to examine appellate cases in which a perpetuity violation was found to exist.
Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 8, at 1033-34 n.24, 1047 n.51. With re-
spect, this is an unrealistic suggestion, for two reasons. First, only a fraction of
perpetuity violations reach the appellate-court stage. See Waggoner, Uniform Statuto y
Rule, supra note 4, at 580 n.23. Second, in those that do reach that stage the appellate
courts seldom give sufficient information about the facts of the case to determine the age
of the person who would be the youngest measuring life under a wait-and-see regime.
See, e.g., Estate of Pearson, 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336 (1971) (youngest measuring life,
under either the Restatement's list or a causal-relationship formula, would have been
the youngest of the testator's grandnephews and grandneices in being at his death; court
does not identify that person or give that person's age).
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reliable enough to support a waiting period of 90 years, given the
margin-of-safety function that it performs.
III
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Act unclutters the wait-and-see strategy of
perpetuity reform. It makes wait-and-see simple to administer, fair,
and workable. It achieves this objective without the necessity or cost
of front-end or mid-period litigation and without supplying a wait-
ing period that exceeds traditional boundaries. Rather than institu-
tionalizing the twelve-healthy-babies ploy, the 90-year period fits
well within the range of the margin of safety provided by an actual-
measuring-lives approach to wait-and-see, using either the specified-
list or causal-relationship method. 34 Standard perpetuity saving
clauses routinely grant such a margin-of-safety period to thousands
upon thousands of trusts without any demonstrated harm befalling
society as a result.35
34 See the tables set forth in Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 4, at 590
n.39, showing that the waiting period under either of these methods in standard cases
can easily exceed the 90-year period that the Uniform Act authorizes.
35 Without a saving clause, many trusts would violate the common-law Rule.
Note that, by the term standard perpetuity saving clause, I mean to refer to one in
which the descendants of the transferor (or of an ancestor of the transferor) in being at
the creation of the trust (either by direct designation or by virtue of a designation of the
beneficiaries of the trust then in being), plus 21 years, are used to measure a period of
time that provides an adequate margin of safety in which to allow the contingencies in
the trust's future interests to work out harmlessly. I do not mean to refer to a saving
clause using twelve healthy babies from unrelated families.
Professor Dukeminier charges that the Uniform Act "increases the period practi-
cally available to the dead hand by about 50%." Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra
note 8, at 1023 n.2; see also id. at 1046 ("The potential for extension of the dead hand by
about 50 percent is striking."). (Elsewhere, Professor Dukeminier likened the 90-year
period to "pollution." Id. at 1054-55; Dukeminier, Modern Guide, supra note 8, at 1886
n.66.) If Professor Dukeminier means this claim literally, he is charging that the Uni-
form Act increases by 50 percent the margin-of-safety period traditionally granted by
the wait-and-see strategy and by its privately established counterpart, the standard
perpetuity saving clause. If true, the solution would seem to be to propose shortening
the Uniform Act's waiting period to 60 years. But, with respect, the claim does not seem
credible. For it to be credible, the youngest person among groups of measuring lives
would have to average out to be about 38 years old rather than 6 years old, as deter-
mined by the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Act and its Advisors. (The remaining
life expectancy of a 38-year-old is 39 years, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 32, at
69 table 108, which, with the 21-year tack-on period, gives a period of 60 years (39 +
21).) More likely, if a 38-year-old is in the group of measuring lives, he or she is not the
youngest. It is more plausible to think that the youngest is that 38-year-old's 6-year-old
child, upon whose remaining life expectancy the 90-year period of the Uniform Act is
predicated.
Professor Dukeminier offers no evidence to support his charge. He mentions again,
see supra note 12 and accompanying text, the assertion that a 90-year margin-of-safety
period can only be achieved by the twelve-healthy-babies ploy-a false assertion. See
supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; notes 17-18 and accompanying text; note 26;
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notes 31-34 and accompanying text. His other evidence relates to the actual duration of
existing trusts, as reported to him by three law firms from whom he made inquiries.
Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 8, at 1045-46. Such anecdotal evidence has
nothing to do with the average length of the margin-of-safety period that can be pro-
vided under the current common-law Rule by a standard perpetuity saving clause. If
perpetuity saving clauses are to provide an adequate margin of safety, they must of ne-
cessity establish a period that extends beyond--often substantially beyond-the time
when the contingencies in the trusts work themselves out. The length of the unused
end-portion of the margin-of-safety period has nothing at all to do with dead-hand con-
trol. See supra notes 4 & 26; see also Waggoner, Uniform Statutory Rule, supra note 4, at 590
n.39.
In the final analysis, the 90-year period of the Uniform Act does not increase by 50
percent the margin-of-safety period traditionally granted by wait-and-see or standard
perpetuity saving clauses. It is, in fact, well within traditional boundaries.
